This case reviews the air battles American Airlines (AA) 
INTRODUCTION
etween 1978 -the year of deregulation -and 1990, there were 58 new airline ventures with only oneAmerica West -surviving. However, America West flirted with failure for years and it had become clear that an airline based solely on lower fares does not work. In the late 1990's customer service was the only strategic marketing tool a carrier could use to pull customers away from an established airline. Years later, JetBlue had success with low fares coupled with high service quality.
Legend Airlines was attacking the industry from the other side with quality flights and superior customer service with a laser focus on passengers who traveled frequently and paid top fares. Legend's value proposition provided superior customer service with comparable prices in the Dallas market. However, the opportunity to test this proposition in the marketplace eluded Legend Airlines as it spent the majority of its existence locked in a legal battle with American Airlines.
THE LEGAL BATTLE
Legend Air was the worst nightmare that American Airlines could imagine. American Airlines' management waged a legal battle against Legend Airlines because business travelers are the lifeblood of the airline industry and American Airlines had no answer to compete in the marketplace. Though these full-fare passengers -"road warriors" in air-lingo -make up just 10% of the typical carrier's customers, but they account for nearly half its revenue. So adding or losing a few business types per flight can mean the difference between a profit and a loss.
The legal battle centered on Legend's right to use Love Field, conveniently located near downtown Dallas. Legend Airlines offered first class travel from the most convenient terminal in Dallas, but at coach prices. Although the Wright Amendment did not allow planes that seat more than 56 passengers to fly to states outside those contiguous to the state of Texas, Legend got around the restrictions by refitting the DC9 aircraft, which normally can carry 130 passengers, with 56 all leather, all first class seats. American Airlines sued in federal court to prevent Legend Airlines from operating out of Love Field under the provisions of the Wright Amendment. Each time Legend's right to fly was upheld by a court, American immediately appealed the decision to a higher court. The constant legal struggle was a serious drain on the fledgling company's financial resources and was a major factor in the Legend's eventual failure.
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LEGEND AIRLINE'S VALUE PROPOSITION
Customer experience can be described as the satisfaction derived from the right combination of quality, customer service, and price. Legend Airline's value proposition was a direct result of applying creativity and innovation to solve consumer problems and to leverage opportunities that people face every day. Their value proposition was a result of a process of blending together quality, design, features and style into a need satisfying bundle, which, if costs are controlled, can be sold for a reasonable profit. Value-oriented firms, like Legend Airlines, do not make the mistake of being all things to all people, but instead make a promise to a specific segment that can and will be fulfilled.
The idea for Legend Airlines was born when a group of individuals who were fed up with the hassles of air travel felt it was time for an airline that offered business travelers a stress-free and productive travel experience. 
THE ECONOMIC REALITY
McArtor could not have conceived a worst nightmare for American Airlines. American Airlines chose to fight Legend Airlines in the courts rather than in the air. The economic reality that American Airline's management was dealing with is summarized below. McArtor planned to keep Legend aloft by using non-union labor and flying just one type of airline (DC-9) over a few choice routes. That way it can generate 27 cents of revenue for every seat-mile it flies, compared with about 14 cents for cost-laden airlines like American -an advantage that should allow Legend to break-even on flight that are little more than half full. Variable costs per passenger, given that Legend's cuisine such as berry crepes, poached salmon and grilled shrimp with mango sauce, fine wines and truffles, was significantly more upscale than the traditional offering of chicken "whatever" and beef "you guess what it is, that is" offered by American and other competitors would be much higher. Estimates of Legend's variable costs were $25.00 which was twice AA's cost ($12.50 per passenger).
As Legend and AA were utilizing the McDonnell Douglas DC-9, one of the world's most popular commercial air transports, as well as being comfortable, safe, and quiet. American Airlines had a 130 seat configuration while Legend was constrained to 56 seats.
THE ANALYSIS
If you were an analyst for American Airlines' operation center, how would you justify the argument that the Legend business model is a serious threat to the profitability of American Airlines? Consider the following.

Compare side by side the operating income of flights between Dallas and any of the 2 Legend Airline destinations.  What is the average fare for both airlines?  While American Airlines has an average fare, what is the average fare for the "road warriors?"  What is the implication of losing "road warrior" business to Legend Airlines?  Illustrate what it is worth to provide outstanding customer service.
TEACHING NOTES
This case provides an interesting opportunity for analysis of the competitive analysis that Legend Airlines created such a daunting advantage that American Airline took the legal route in fighting it. The key to untangling this analysis is in the sentence at the beginning of the case, though these full-fare passengers -"road warriors," in air-lingo -make up just 10% of the typical carrier's customers, but they account for nearly half its revenue.

Gathering the information
The following information is used as input: For American Airline's DC-9 with 130 seats: 10% of seats occupied by road warriors are 13 seats. 50% of the revenue is 0.50% of $21,512 is $10,756, so average revenue per "road warrior" is $10,756 / 13 = $ 827.38. Average revenue for the rest of the plane is $10,756 / 117 = $ 91.93
A portioning of the plane shows the urgency that American Airlines faced. The road warrior to non-road warrior ratio for revenue per seat mile is about 9:1, meaning that for every road warrior lost, American will need to find nine non-road warrior fares to compensate for lost revenue. In a normal situation, this might be a viable option, but if American Airlines are at or near capacity, then the problem is exposed.
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Epilogue
Since 2000, the large airlines moved towards providing a "business class" section in their planes to provide better service to their road warriors. Still the level of customer service falls short of the Legend model. There have other new startups, such as Eoa Airlines, MAXjet, L'Avion, and Silverjet, that targeted the cost conscious business traveler. On the other hand, the majors knew that steaks and champagne were a factor that attracted this market, but the critical factors were frequency and convenience, sometime the upstarts could not match.
